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l3.1  Background of the Commission 
13.1.1  Political Aspects 
The Gold Commission was established in accordance with a provi- 
sion in an Act of Congress of October 7, 1980 (P.L. 96-389), of which 
the main matter was enlarging the quota assigned to the United States 
in the International Monetary Fund. The provision, introduced as an 
amendment to the Senate bill by  Senator Jesse Helms (Republican, 
North Carolina), was accepted by the leadership to obtain his acqui- 
escence to consideration by the Senate of the IMF quota enlargement. 
A similar arrangement was made in the House, where the amendment 
to the House bill was introduced by Congressman Ron Paul (Repub- 
lican, Texas). 
The provision directed the secretary of the Treasury to establish and 
chair a commission consisting of 
1. Three members of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System and two members of the Council of  Economic Advisers 
to be designated by him 
2.  One majority and one minority member of the Joint Economic 
Committee, the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Af- 
fairs of  the Senate, and the Committee on Banking, Finance, and 
Urban Affairs of the House of  Representatives, to be designated 
by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President 
of the Senate, respectively 
3.  Four distinguished private citizens with business, finance, or ac- 
ademic backgrounds, to be designated  by the secretary  of  the 
Treasury. 
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The Commission was to “conduct a study to assess and make rec- 
ommendations with regard to the policy of the U.S. Government con- 
cerning the role of gold in domestic and international monetary  sys- 
tems’’ and to report its findings and recommendations to the Congress 
no later than one year after enactment. No special budget for the Com- 
mission was provided but sums from the international operations bud- 
get of the Treasury Department were to be available to the Commission 
to carry out its functions. 
An arrangement was reportedly made with the Carter Administration 
by which it would not proceed with the appointment of members of 
the Commission pending the November election results. If the Dem- 
ocrats lost, it would be left to the incoming administration to implement 
the provision. The new administration was slow in doing so. The names 
of  the appointed members  were not announced until June 22,  1981. 
The Commission’s first meeting was on July 16.’ 
The law specified that the Commission have fifteen members plus a 
chairman. However, Henry Reuss, the chairman of the Joint Economic 
Committee, designated Chalmers Wylie, a close ally of  his though a 
Republican, to represent  the House side. Senator Jepsen, the vice- 
chairman and a Republican, designated himself to represent the Senate 
side. It was obviously contrary to the law to have two Republicans as 
the Joint Economic Committee members. Rather than withdraw Wy- 
lie’s designation, Reuss named himself as the Democratic represen- 
tative of the JEC from the House side. The Commission thus ended 
up having three, rather than two members, as prescribed by the law, 
representing the JEC, and with a total of sixteen members rather than 
fifteen members plus the chairman. 
Establishment of the Gold Commission was the third piece of leg- 
islation affecting gold in which Senator Helms was a prime mover. On 
his  initiative, the right to include gold  clauses in  private  contracts 
entered into on or after October 28, 1977, was enacted (P.L. 95-147). 
The program of Treasury medallion sales, in accordance with the Amer- 
ican Arts Gold Medallion Act of  November 10, 1978, was a second 
legislative initiative of the senator (P.L. 95-630). He was unsuccessful 
in subsequent efforts in  1980 to suspend Treasury gold sales and to 
provide for restitution of IMF gold. 
13.1.2  Economic Views of  the Commission’s Sponsors 
The amendment to the IMF bill was introduced and approved in the 
Senate on June 16,1980, and in the House on September 18,1980. The 
year-to-year change in the consumer price index in 1980 was at a post- 
war peak-13.5  percent. This factor clearly motivated the sponsors of 
the amendment, though the Senate and House protagonists expressed 
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we need to limit our purview to the statements made by the sponsors 
of the amendment on introducing it. We  can also examine differences 
between the two pro-gold leaders that were made clear in hearings 
before the Subcommittee on Mines and Mining of the Committee of 
Interior and Insular Affairs of the House on Feasibility of a Return to 
the Gold Standard.2 The hearings were held on October 2, 1980, a few 
days before passage of the law enlarging the IMF quota and the pro- 
vision to create the Gold Commission. 
One difference between the sponsors of the amendment was revealed 
in their statements on introducing the amendment. In the Senate, re- 
ferring to the suspension of convertibility into gold in  1971, Helms 
observed: “It is no coincidence that inflation of the dollar which pre- 
cipitated the final break with gold, accelerated after the last vestige of 
gold’s discipline was removed.”  He went on to criticize the role of the 
United States and the IMF in contributing to monetary instability of 
other nations, and to contrast the views of Keynesians and monetarists, 
who share skepticism about “a strong role of  gold in the monetary 
system,” with the views of classical economists who “criticize current 
monetary disorder and see the only proper response as reforms which 
take into account the changing demand for currencies, and the stability 
of the value of the unit of exchange.”  He closed with the statement, 
“I would expect that the commission would report to the Congress 
that there is little unanimity among the experts. I would expect, how- 
ever, that the Keynesian view; the monetarist view; and the neoclass- 
ical view will be examined fully; the implications of each will be ana- 
lyzed  and  recommendations will  be  made  on the basis  of  the best 
judgment of  the commission  member^."^  Senator Helms referred to 
Arthur Laffer as one of the leaders of the neoclassical view. Congress- 
man Paul, on the other hand, in his House Statement on the amendment 
expressed the hope that the commission would take into “consideration 
the viewpoint of the neoclassical economists better known as Austrian 
school economists.  I would  suggest their  view  be  investigated  and 
expressed in this commission report as 
This difference in the identification of the leadership of the neoclass- 
ical school of economics turns out to be significant for understanding 
the outcome of the Gold Commission performance. 
At the hearings before the Subcommittee on Mines and Mining (held 
under the auspices of this subcommittee, as Congressman Paul noted, 
since “the House Banking Committee has been extremely reluctant to 
hold any hearings on this topic”), Paul testified on a bill he had intro- 
duced on July 30,  1980,  “to repeal the privilege of banks to create 
money,” the title, on enactment, to be the “Monetary Freedom Act.” 
The bill outlined a plan for returning the United States to a full gold 
coin standard within two years of  its passage. The bill provided for the 320  Anna J. Schwartz 
repeal of legal tender laws; the redemption in gold coin or bullion in 
weights not less than five grams by the secretary of the Treasury 360 
days after enactment of outstanding Federal Reserve notes at the mean 
of the spot prices of gold on the New York Commodity Exchange and 
the Chicago Board of Trade on five immediately preceding business 
days, redemption to cease after one year, and gold coin in circulation 
thereafter to function as the money of account, defined as the gram of 
gold, ninety-nine one-hundredths fine; cessation of the issue of Federal 
Reserve notes and United States notes on the date of enactment; free 
banking with a 100 percent reserve requirement effective 360 days after 
enactment  .5 
The argument offered for repeal of legal tender laws is that the Con- 
stitution forbids the states to make anything but gold and silver a tender 
in payment of debt and does not permit the federal government to make 
anything a legal tender. Congress passed a legal tender act for the first 
time in  1862 to ensure acceptance of greenbacks. Repeal of the legal 
tender laws would free creditors to accept in payment for debts due 
them only what they have contracted to accept. 
The other provisions of the bill need no elaboration. They are ob- 
viously constructed from libertarian principles and a belief in the su- 
periority of commodity money. 
Senator Helms delivered a statement to the Subcommittee on Mines 
and Mining but did not personally appear. He submitted a bill intro- 
duced in the Senate two days earlier by him and Senators Goldwater 
and McClure “to provide for the reinstatement of the dollar as a gold 
reserve  currency, to stabilize the value of the dollar, and for other 
purposes.”6 The bill translated  into legislative language a plan  that 
Arthur B. Laffer had published on February 29, 1980, as an economic 
study of A. B. Laffer Associates, “Reinstatement of the Dollar: The 
Blueprint .” 
Laffer’s plan provides for an announcement by the United States of 
its intention to return to a convertible dollar at some prespecified time 
in the future, according to the bill, six months after enactment. The 
price of gold, designated the standard price of gold, would be fixed at 
the average price of gold bullion at New York for immediate delivery 
prevailing during the five business days preceding resumption of con- 
vertibility at the standard price. During the period before resumption, 
the Federal Reserve would maintain the monetary base literally un- 
changed and the Treasury and Federal Reserve would intervene neither 
in foreign exchange nor the government securities markets. Borrowings 
from Federal Reserve Banks would remain frozen. 
On the day of  resumption, the proportion of the total value of gold 
at the standard price of gold relative to the monetary base becomes 
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stand ready to sell gold at 100.7 percent of the standard price of gold 
and to buy gold at 99.3 percent of the standard price, the minimum 
quantity having a value of $10,000 at the standard price. 
Should the gold reserve fall below 75 percent of the target reserve 
quantity, no change would be permitted in the monetary base. Should 
it fall below 50 percent of the target reserve quantity, the monetary 
base would be decreased by  1 percent  per month.  Should the gold 
reserve rise above 125 percent of the target reserve quantity, the mon- 
etary base would be increased by 1 percent per month. Should the gold 
reserve rise above 150 percent of the target reserve quantity, the mon- 
etary base would be increased by 2 percent per month. Should the gold 
reserve fall below 25 percent or rise above more than 175 percent of 
the target  reserve quantity, the Board of  Governors of  the Federal 
Reserve would  proclaim  a gold holiday. During a gold holiday, the 
standard price would cease to apply, the Federal Reserve would neither 
buy nor sell gold from its reserves, and no change in the value of the 
monetary base greater than 1 percent would be permitted. A new stan- 
dard price of gold would be determined by the average price of  gold 
bullion during the five business days ending on the ninetieth day after 
the proclamation. 
Congressman Paul described the provision for a gold holiday as “the 
weakest part” of Laffer’s proposal “because it introduces the fact that 
you plan not to have a stable currency and credit supply. That means 
you expect and anticipate that we will continue with our Federal Re- 
serve System, and with the Congress able to abuse the monetary sys- 
tem, and, therefore, you have to have a hedge, and this hedge is the 
gold holiday system. This may actually be worse than what we had 
before .’  l7 
Laffer, who was a witness at the subcommittee hearings, defended 
the provision:  “It is trying to protect from that situation that occurs 
infrequently but every 10,  15 years when you have a brand new dis- 
covery of gold, if the quantity of gold triples, I would hate to say the 
price level rises. The objective again is still maintaining price stability 
of a bundle of  goods and using gold as the controlling valve on the 
system, but not to, per se, control the dollar price of gold but to control 
the dollar price of gas [sic; goods?] and services and using as a regulator 
gold. When there is a disturbance in the gold market, I don’t want to 
see the whole economy suffer inflation or deflation because of some 
change in that market.”* 
The contrast is evident between Helms’s support of Laffer’s variant 
of a traditional gold standard, with a fixed but adjustable price of gold, 
and with some modification of the existing institutional arrangements 
under the Federal Reserve System, and Paul’s lack of interest in any 
form of a gold standard other than a 100 percent coin standard, with 322  Anna J. Schwartz 
no face value for the coins, prices expressed in weights of gold, and a 
complete break with the existing institutional banking system. 
13.2  What Purpose Was the Commission Designed to Serve? 
We  now turn to the question of what allies with such different gold 
objectives in mind hoped to achieve through the establishment of the 
Gold Commission. 
Sponsors of  a commission may have a variety of objectives. One 
objective may be to focus public attention on a problem that they regard 
as important. The sponsors may have a solution for the problem but 
lack the support for its implementation. One indication that the spon- 
sors of  the Commission set great store by  this objective  was their 
insistence that meetings of the Commission be open to the public. They 
objected strongly to the first closed meeting; thereafter, all meetings 
were open. Another objective may be to educate the public. Commis- 
sions can perform a genuine public service by collecting and summa- 
rizing facts and opinions on a national problem. They may make old 
ideas respectable, publicizing them and giving them legitimacy. Ideas 
that may have been limited to special groups may be given wider cur- 
rency by a commission’s study. Commissions may also serve to develop 
a consensus. The sponsors of the Gold Commission may well have had 
all these objectives in mind.9 
The inclusion as members of representatives of constituencies with 
direct involvement in the problem under consideration-in  this case, 
the Federal Reserve System-suggests  that one purpose was to build 
a consensus or  to develop support for a change in policy. A commission 
with bipartisan and bicameral balancing-as  the law intended-is  ev- 
idently designed to have political impact. Whatever the Commission 
recommended  would  be  expected  to  meet  the  test  of  political 
acceptability. 
The 1980 Republican Party platform included a paragraph on mon- 
etary reform that could be interpreted as a veiled reference to a pro- 
jected return to a gold standard. The sponsors of the establishment of 
the Gold Commission possibly were counting on the White House to 
signal its interest in a strong pro-gold recommendation by the Com- 
mission. Such a signal would have influenced the designation of mem- 
bers. In that event, the number of members subject to White House 
influence would have formed a majority: four Republican Congressional 
members, the four public members, two members from the Council of 
Economic Advisers, and the chairman. No signal, however, apparently 
came from the White House. 
As a result, the Commission came into existence with no sense of 
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mission was not fully evident from the start. Whatever principled rea- 
sons the three Federal Reserve governors on the Commission (Partee, 
Rice, and Wallich) may have had to oppose an enlarged role for gold 
in the monetary system, they also had a strong self-interest in doing 
so, because of the implied rebuke to their conduct of monetary policy 
that such a recommendation would have conveyed. Their primary con- 
cern was to limit discussion touching on  the performance of the Federal 
Reserve. Governor Wallich argued at the first meeting that the subjects 
of  inflation and monetary policy were not a proper concern  of  the 
Commission. He was supported by the JEC House members (Reuss 
and  Wylie), who repeatedly  stressed that  neither subject had  been 
discussed  in  the  House  when  the amendment  to the  IMF bill  was 
introduced. 
Both inflation and monetary policy, however, deeply concerned Jerry 
Jordan  (a Council member)  and  Stephen Neal  (the House  Banking 
Committee majority member). The views of other congressional mem- 
bers (Senators Dodd and Schmitt, Senate Banking Committee minority 
and majority members, and Jepsen) were not initially well defined. Two 
Administration representatives-Murray  Weidenbaum, chairman of the 
Council, and Secretary of the Treasury Regan-did not tip their hands 
until the final two meetings of the Commission.  Of  the four public 
members, one was a gold dealer (Herbert Coyne), one a businessman 
identified with conservative intellectual  positions  (Lewis Lehrman), 
one a California lawyer who had served in the Reagan state adminis- 
tration (Arthur Costamagna), one an economist, a former chairman of 
the Council of Economic Advisers, and a member of President Reagan's 
economic policy advisory board (Paul McCracken). 
By the time the Commission had concluded its sessions, it was clear 
that the pro-gold group consisted of an awkward coalition of Congress- 
man Paul and two of the public members, Lehrman and Costamagna. 
It was awkward because neither of the latter supported the conception 
of the monetary system that Paul advocated. Lehrman had in mind a 
traditional gold standard, restoring dollar convertibility into gold, al- 
though  he also proposed  changing Federal  Reserve institutional ar- 
rangements, prohibiting open market operations and making the dis- 
count rate a penalty rate.Io As for Costamagna, his sole concern for 
the present was to provide the market with U.S.-minted bullion coins. 
The maximum expectations of the sponsors would have been realized 
if  there had been White House support for a strong pro-gold recom- 
mendation by the Commission. Failing that support, the sponsors were 
probably content to use the Commission as a forum to promote what- 
ever use of gold they could prevail on the Commission to accept while 
focusing public attention on the importance they attached to a role for 
gold in the monetary system. 324  Anna J. Schwartz 
13.3.  What Did the Sponsors Gain? 
13.3.1  Commission Recommendations 
The Report of the Commission is in two volumes. Volume 1 contains 
what was conceived to be a report reflecting all views expressed by 
the members. An introductory chapter presents the Commission’s rec- 
ommendations on six subjects. Footnotes of dissent and qualifications 
of  the recommendations by various members appear on nineteen of 
the twenty-one pages of the chapter. Four chapters follow. The first 
deals with the background of the establishment of the Commission; the 
second analyzes U.S. experience with gold since 1834; the third dis- 
cusses types of monetary standards, including gold, other commodity, 
and paper money standards. The final chapter describes existing gold 
arrangements in the United States and proposals for change. An ap- 
pendix on the gold market and a statistical compendium of time series 
relating to gold output, stocks, supply of and demand for gold, and the 
nominal and real price of gold complete the volume. Dissents by the 
Federal Reserve members, Congressmen Reuss and Wylie, and Mr. 
Coyne appear on various pages of  these chapters. 
Volume 2 of the Report is described as “annexes.”  The bulk of the 
volume is occupied by a minority report. 
The existence of  a minority  report was not  revealed to the Gold 
Commission until a few days before the final revision of the Report 
that  was  intended  to represent  all views.  The minority  report  was 
prepared  under the direction  of  Congressman  Paul and  mirrors his 
views rather than those of Lewis Lehrman who endorsed it. Arthur 
Costamagna gave the minority report a qualified endorsement. He pro- 
posed delay in the implementation of the program outlined therein until 
the Reagan  Administration’s  fiscal and monetary programs and the 
recommendations of  the Gold Commission were given an opportunity 
to prove themselves. I discuss the minority report after examining the 
extent to which the Commission’s recommendations accomplished ends 
that the pro-gold minority sought. 
The majority rejected the proposal that the United States should fix 
the price of gold and restore gold reserve requirements for the Federal 
Reserve. Except for Lehrman, no member of  the Commission advo- 
cated such a course. They rejected a return to fixed exchange rates 
and endorsed a floating exchange rate system. Again, only Lehrman 
held a brief for fixed exchange rates. 
The main  substantive proposal was the recommendation that  the 
Treasury issue gold bullion coins of specified weights, without dollar 
denomination or legal tender status, to be manufactured from its ex- 
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value of the gold content, the coins to be exempt from capital gains 
taxes and from sales taxes. This recommendation was clearly a victory 
for both Helms and Paul. Senator Helms had cosponsored an October 5, 
1981, bill (S. 1704) that provides for the minting of gold coins exempt 
from U.S. and state capital gains taxes. Assigning no legal tender status 
to the coins was a victory for Congressman Paul. 
For the pro-gold forces, introducing gold coins into circulation was 
a first  step toward  achieving their  ultimate objective of  linking the 
monetary system to gold. For them, the step represents provision of a 
form of currency alternative to paper dollars. They conceive that hold- 
ers will engage in transactions denominated in weights of coins rather 
than dollars. The other members who supported the recommendation 
did not share that conception. They regarded such coins as alternatives 
to foreign bullion coins that have found a market in the United States. 
For them, purchase of the coins would reflect an investment, not a 
transactions ,  demand. 
At least six dissents were recorded with respect to exempting the 
coins from capital gains taxes for the obvious reason that the exemption 
would provide an incentive to shift from gold bullion holdings ,  common 
stocks, or productive assets to coins. 
The members would not accept, as part of the recommendation, a 
price or quantity limit on the minting of the coins, leaving open the 
possibility that the demand might exhaust the Treasury’s gold stock. 
Those who conceived of the demand for the coins as a transactions 
demand were opposed to a limit on the minting of the coins. A large- 
scale demand for coins would, according to them, indicate dissatisfac- 
tion with the management of the dollar money supply and lead to the 
de facto establishment of a gold coin standard. On this view, estab- 
lishment of an arbitrary quantity limit or a high seignorage fee would 
interfere with the expression of public preferences. Those who believed 
that the demand for coins would be an investment demand assumed 
that it would not be quantitatively significant, and on this ground neither 
opposed nor supported a legislated limit. Underlying this view is the 
assumption that only U.S. residents would acquire the coins in small 
quantities. It is conceivable, however, that domestic or foreign buyers 
would order large quantities on a given day. Such an order, if placed 
in the gold market, would raise the price. That consequence would not 
follow at the Treasury sales window. 
Another  aspect  of  the  recommendation  that  official gold  bullion 
coins be minted is the exclusion of private mints from the operation. 
Only  the Treasury  is  accorded the  right  to mint  such coins.  Con- 
gressman  Paul  did  not  object  to the  restriction  of  the  coinage to 
Treasury issues in the Report, volume  1. He did so in the minority 
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One other substantive recommendation of the Commission was that 
“the Congress and the Federal Reserve study the merits of establishing 
a  rule  specifying that  the  growth  of  the nation’s money  supply  be 
maintained at a steady rate which insures long-run price stability.’’ In 
a redundant  sentence that is part of  the same recommendation, the 
Commission added that “the Congress and the Federal Reserve should 
study ways to improve the conduct of monetary policy, including such 
alternatives as adopting a monetary rule.”  The recommendation was 
vehemently  opposed by the three Federal Reserve Board governors 
and Congressmen Reuss and Wylie. The gold supporters voted for it.” 
Congressman Neal offered a stronger resolution that the Commission 
recommend that “the Congress by legislation establish a rule specifying 
that the growth of the nation’s money supply be maintained at a steady 
rate which insures long-run price stability.” The members were evenly 
split on the vote for the resolution. Congressman Neal went on record 
with the statement that  “by  recommending more  study rather than 
outright enactment of a monetary rule, we missed a golden opportunity 
to help secure long-term price stability, low interest rates, and high 
employment. I intend to continue my efforts to enact a monetary rule 
through legislation.” 
13.3.2  Commission Hearings 
Two meetings of  the Commission were devoted to hearings on the 
role of gold in domestic and international monetary systems. Twenty- 
three witnesses testified. In addition, forty-seven individuals submitted 
written statements of their views. 
The hearings validated Senator Helms’s expectation that “there is 
little unanimity among the experts.”  The hearings provided an oppor- 
tunity for views of Keynesians, monetarists, and neoclassical econo- 
mists, as defined by Helms and Paul, to be heard. Of the twenty-three 
witnesses, only two forthrightly supported a return to a traditional gold 
standard. Two advocated nontraditional forms of a gold standard; one 
urged that gold be part of the solution to current problems, but pre- 
scribed no specific model. Two attorneys attacked the present mone- 
tary system as unconstitutional. The remaining witnesses were about 
evenly divided in ruling out any role for gold at the present or any time 
or in suggesting ways, short of a gold standard, to provide uses for 
gold, either as coin, cover for Treasury bond issues, market sales of 
gold to finance federal budget deficits, or to settle international pay- 
ments imbalances. 
The choice of witnesses was based on the rule the Treasury adopted 
that at lemt two members had to suggest the same individual. Some 
gold supporters apparently were disappointed that more witnesses sup- 
porting a traditional gold standard were not heard from.’* 327  Reflections on the Gold Commission Report 
13.3.3  Minority Report 
The minority report includes seven chapters. The first chapter deals 
with the present monetary crisis, which it dates from the closing of the 
gold window on August 15, 1971.  Persistent inflation, high interest rates, 
a weak economy, and high unemployment are attributed to that event. 
The chapter focuses on monetarism as not an answer to the problem. 
“The monetarists share our view that the Federal Reserve’s discre- 
tionary policy of the last several decades has been the cause of  our 
inflation. However, we are confident that the monetarist  solution is 
unworkable.” The reason is that monetarism cannot be followed, that 
governments and the people in charge will “always abuse the ‘right’ 
to create money if  it is granted to them.”  Moreover, “monetarism is 
similar to a discretionary inflationary policy in that the government 
remains as the monopolist  fully in  charge. In contrast, with a fully 
convertible gold standard, the people are in charge and can call the 
government’s bluff anytime they choose by turning in their paper cer- 
tificates for gold.” 
Before laying out the minority plans for a sound monetary system, 
the report presents two lengthy chapters, generally at a high level of 
scholarship, on U.S. money and banking history in the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries. The conclusion is that that experience “illustrates 
the overwhelmingly superior caes for the gold standard as against any 
form  of  paper standard.”  The solution is to adopt a “modern  gold 
standard” in two steps: first to tie the dollar to gold at a fixed weight 
and, after the public becomes accustomed to this concept, the currency 
unit will become that fixed weight. In addition, the central government’s 
monopoly of the minting business must be abolished. It is the inter- 
vention of government that created problems under the historical gold 
standard. Laissez-faire must be applied  to banking.  “The  historical 
evidence shows that monetary freedom does not fail, intervention by 
the government does.” 
The report then presents two chapters dealing with  the case for 
monetary freedom and the case for the gold standard. The case for the 
gold standard is based on historical, theoretical, economic, and moral 
grounds. 
The penultimate chapter deals with “the transition to monetary free- 
dom.”  It outlines three possible ways of reaching monetary freedom. 
One is government action to create the new system, but the danger is 
that it will result in a pseudo- rather than a real gold standard.13 A 
second way, in the absence of government action, is bottom-up re- 
form-presumably  voluntary actions by the public to use gold in or- 
dinary transactions. A third way is for government to clear the obstacles 
now impeding reform from the bottom up. The immediate need under 328  Anna J. Schwartz 
this option  is for Congress to repeal the legal tender laws  and  the 
authority of the Federal Reserve to conduct open market operations. 
Failure to act will lead to the collapse of the official money and the 
official economy. 
Four specific reforms are then outlined to roll back government and 
once again confine it within the limits of the Constitution. The monetary 
reforms include  some already noted  earlier:  abolishing legal tender 
laws, defining the dollar as a weight of gold (the weight is not specified 
in the report), issuing gold coins to serve as an alternative monetary 
system to the present  “paper  money monopoly,”  permitting private 
mints to issue their own coins under their own trademarks, unrestricted 
money issues by competing issuers, retiring Federal Reserve notes and 
replacing  them  by  notes redeemable  in  gold,  silver, or some other 
commodity, 100 percent reserves to replace fractional reserve banking. 
Other reforms affect fiscal policy and are directed at a balanced budget, 
a reduction in both spending and taxes (“honest money and limited 
government are equally necessary in order to end our present economic 
crisis”),  and the confining of government payments to gold or gold 
denominated accounts. Eventually also the government would accept 
gold as payment for all taxes, duties, and dues. Deregulation of banking 
and free entry would complete the reform program. 
The chapter on transition concludes with one marked difference from 
the views Congressman Paul expressed in the hearings before the Sub- 
committee on Mines and Mining. There he stated, “If we proceed to 
a gold standard in an orderly fashion, such as I have proposed, then 
there will be no depression.”14 In the minority report, by contrast, we 
read:  “The transition from the present monetary system to a sound 
system will probably not be painless, as some have suggested. When- 
ever the increase in the supply of money slows, there are always reces- 
sions. . . .  In any transition to a sound monetary system there will, of 
necessity, have to be readjustments  made  in various  sectors of  the 
economy. Such readjustments will temporarily hurt certain individuals 
and enterprises.” Six sectors that will suffer transitional difficulties are 
examined: real estate, agriculture, heavy industry, small business, ex- 
ports, banking. 
The prediction in the final chapter is that the “gold standard reces- 
sion” will be short and mild. It is estimated that the transition will be 
accomplished in three years, the resulting  recession lasting about a 
year. Thereafter ten years of prosperity will follow, with inflation, the 
business cycle, and high interest rates things of the past. 
13.3.4  Conclusion 
The creation of the Gold Commission served one paramount objec- 
tive of its sponsors. It promoted discussion of gold in the media, on 329  Reflections on the Gold Commission Report 
television, and among a lay public committed to the view expressed in 
the minority report that only gold is “honest”  money. The minority 
report itself is a rallying call for the faithful. Both Helms and Paul were 
committed to the immediate objective of the minting of gold bullion 
coins by the Treasury. As the minority report noted: “We are extremely 
pleased that the Gold Commission has recommended to the Congress 
a new gold coinage. It has been almost fifty years since the last United 
States gold coins were struck, and renewing this Constitutional function 
would indeed be a cause for celebration and jubilee.”I5 Short of the 
appointment of a Commission committed to restoring the gold standard, 
the sponsors probably view the limited results attained as a gain in 
achieving their ultimate objectives.  l6 
The ultimate objectives of Helms and Paul differ but they may not 
part company in the interim.  Like Lehrman,  who did  not  want  to 
distance himself from Paul and therefore endorsed the minority report, 
Helms may choose to support the more radical, populist posture that 
Paul supports than the more conventional one that he on his own might 
choose.17 The desire not to split the pro-gold forces was recently also 
made evident by Paul. He circulated a petition entitled “Economists 
for Gold” among economics departments of various universities. The 
gold standard described in the petition did not make clear that the gold 
standard Paul sought was not the traditional one. 
On two issues, Paul found no support in the Gold Commission. He 
regards the present ten-year audit of the gold inventory as totally in- 
adequate and proposed annual audits. As had Helms independently, 
he also sought restitution of IMF gold to member countries. 
13.4  Likely Impact of the Commission Report 
The commission reported on March 31, 1982. It is likely that in the 
months ahead reviews of  the Report will’appear in the economic jour- 
nals and that its contents will be examined by public discussion panels. 
It will be judged on its adequacy in answering the questions directed 
to the Commission by the law that established it. Whatever the verdict 
will be on the quality of the Report, the pro-gold group will probably 
find satisfaction in the very fact that it provides an establishment dis- 
cussion of gold. As an April  14 editorial of the  Wall Street Journal 
expressed this view, “The Gold Commission  . . . has performed the 
very valuable service of reclaiming gold from the gold bugs.”I8 
But the pro-gold group was not the only group that derived satis- 
faction from the outcome. So also did many economists and commen- 
tators who do not favor an expanded role for gold, among whom I 
include myself. Some had initially feared a Commission dominated by 
“gold bugs” and were pleased to find that in the Commission as in the 330  Anna J. Schwartz 
economics profession and in the informed public, the supporters of an 
enlarged role for gold were in a small minority. 
It also remains  to be  seen whether the  Congress will  act on the 
recommendations  of  the Commission.  Even before  the Report  was 
submitted  to the Congress, the House Banking Committee issued a 
statement (signed by thirty members of the Committee, not including 
Congressman  Neal)  opposing  the  Commission’s  recommendation, 
adopted at its meeting on February 12, that the Treasury issue gold 
bullion coins. According to the statement, issue of coins, without legal 
tender status, would create monetary confusion; the capital gains tax 
exemption would damage the already weakened security markets; and 
the sales tax exemption would deprive the states of revenues needed 
to cover their enhanced obligations. The statement also objected to 
recommendations referring “to such matters as monetary growth rules 
and the system of floating as compared with fixed exchange rates. The 
Commission was not authorized to discuss these matters, was not con- 
stituted with a view to providing a balanced and professional perspec- 
tive  on them, did not  discuss them adequately at its meetings,  and 
should not have mentioned them in its Rep~rt.”’~  Congressman Reuss 
led the opposition  to the contents of  the Report referred  to in  the 
Banking Committee’s statement. Since he is retiring from the Congress 
at the end of the present session, there is a possibility that the new 
Congress may respond more positively to the recommendations. 
What is undeniable is that continued monetary instability and high 
and variable inflation and interest rates are the breeding ground for 
support for a restoration of a monetary role for gold. It may be one of 
the ironies of history that the Commission was established when the 
inflation rate was slowing and therefore undercutting some of the ra- 
tionale and urgency for a return to a gold standard expressed by its 
adherents. The pro-gold forces, however, predict that the recent slow- 
ing of inflation is temporary and that the battle against it will be won 
only on their terms.20 
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